

This volume of nearly 400 pages, containing pieces on psychoanalysis from eighteen contributors, hardly touches on the question posed in the title. A few contributors do, and not surprisingly reach similar conclusions: no one owns psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is not a brand and therefore it can't be owned. For Thomas Szasz in *What is Psychoanalysis*, the issue is straightforward:

'Ownership, a legal concept, requires that at least two elements be present: it must be possible to clearly define and objectively identify the "thing" owned and the state must recognize "it" as properly subject to ownership. Psychoanalysis does not qualify on either count.' (p. 25)

I doubt that many ever believed that the future of psychoanalysis would be well served by branding it, though, of course, "Psycho-Analysis" was copyrighted for fifty years. But for most of us, it is a body of ideas, a theory of mind, a science, an intellectual discipline, a practice-whichever we prefer. As Bernard Burgoyne says in the first sentence of the first chapter: 'No one today seriously asks: "Who owns physics" ', a point that no subsequent chapter contests, though Adolf Grunbaum and Frank Cioffi assert at the end of the volume that there is nothing there to be owned

So the question, "who owns psychoanalysis?", apparently provocative, lends itself to a simple solution about which there is no controversy. Yet controversy there is, as members of the College of Psychoanalysts know. Unfortunately, anyone seeking clarification of the current political conflict will search in vain in this volume. There is very little here that addresses itself to questions about definition and use of labels, the ground over which the battle has been fought. The editor, Ann Casement, makes the briefest reference to the question of the label during her time as Chair of the UKCP, though many of us will struggle to recognise her account.

It is also the case that the conflict has been avoided. The contributors are drawn from the ranks of the illustrious and, in most cases, they have chosen to write about what interests them. It is worth noting that Lacanians are well represented among the contributors, perhaps reflecting the view in some circles that the issue will be resolved by allowing Lacanians to style themselves as psychoanalysts, while continuing to forbid it to all others. Assuming that designation of this sort is within the gift of this or that body, of course, takes us right back to the question, Who Owns Psychoanalysis?

The voice of the protagonist, members of the UKCP psychoanalytic section, and of the antagonists, members of the BCP, in the British dispute, apart from the Lacanians, is not heard in this volume. No one makes the argument for the use of the label by the Psychoanalytic Section of the UKCP, or for the creation of something like the College, or even the recognition that what we practise is psychoanalysis. What are offered in its place are chapters on the conflicts elsewhere. These are both valuable and interesting, but surely it would have been more intellectually honest to have examined the views of those involved in the struggle here.

Curiously, the voices of the official BPAS and IPA are not heard either.

But to ask for clarity may be absurd. After all, conflict and splitting were not invented by Freud, or even by psychoanalysis. Indeed, within academic disciplines, conflict is a respected tool for achieving understanding, so much so that it is guarded by the rubric of academic freedom. I would argue that psychoanalysis is enriched by this same freedom. Yet, psychoanalysts, historically, have been intolerant and exclusive in their approach to theoretical innovation and diversity within the discipline. The resulting conflicts are treated in this volume by chapters by Sonu Shamidasani, Paul Roazen, Pearl Appel, Elisabeth Roudinesco and Dany Nobus.

So, the question, Who Owns Psychoanalysis?, doesn't provoke the dissention one might have expected, largely because no one is prepared to argue for ownership, though it is true that Burgoyne proposes that "What is needed...is a psychoanalytical society that is seriously able to claim a relation to science. Only if this were to be the case could such a society claim some propriety rights over psychoanalysis." (p. 19)

The editor, thus, is left with the problem of organising a disparate collection of contributions. Unfortunately, the question in the title, and the range of authors and subjects, gives the volume no focus and therefore a structure has had to be invented. Casement has chosen to group the pieces under four headings: Academic, History, Political and Science. While I think I understand the

intention, the groupings are really quite arbitrary. The chapters overlap the groupings and yet have little to tie them together: Placing the contributions in alphabetical order would have made as much sense-or as little.

But it is not my purpose to damn this volume. In itself, it contains interesting and readable material, some new thinking, and many concise statements of familiar positions. Important controversies are addressed here, among them the question of the location of psychoanalysis within the academy, what one might call the fertility of splitting and tolerance, and the problem of the epistemological validity of psychoanalysis, in particular its desire to be a science. There are chapters about the development and plight of psychoanalysis in the New World. What it reveals, perhaps, is how broad a discipline psychoanalysis is, how difficult to define, and how controversial it is, or remains. I would recommend it as a good way to achieve an overview of the current state of several threads of thinking about psychoanalysis. It is bizarre, then, and perhaps significant, that by far the longest piece in the collection is Adolf Grunbaum's *Critique of Psychoanalysis*, a systematic and potent demolition of Freud's central theoretical assertions.

Yet it is important to all of us to know something about who speaks for psychoanalysis, the basis for their claim to do so, and what it is we can claim if we can't claim ownership. It is self-evident that intellectual disciplines, such as anthropology, physics and history, cannot be owned. Notions of academic freedom, never perfectly realised, but struggled for, as the lives and deaths of Galileo and Giordano Bruno attest, have established the idea that intellectual disciplines can be mastered.

So, while we cannot speak of ownership, we can, perhaps, discuss mastery, not forgetting Jorge Ahumada's warning that "...mastery quickly collapses to possessiveness" and so must renounce "ownership pretences." Mastery of a discipline is something that inheres in the student, and while it can to some extent be measured, by examination or publication, it is to speak of the knowledge of someone, their grasp of the literature, practice, indeed of the conflicts and contradictions, that may reside within the subject matter of the discipline. So perhaps the real question is not so much who owns psychoanalysis as who has mastered it, including, perhaps, its epistemological failures. And, too, perhaps the question is not so much whether or not psychoanalysis is a science as it is whether or not psychoanalysis is an intellectual discipline able to be mastered. The practice of psychoanalysis then becomes a form of research akin to the practice of anthropological or historical research-about which, needless to say, there is conflict. We might do well to recall Harold Bloom's theory of literary history in which "strong poets...creatively misinterpret the dominant poetic forerunner, in order to clear imaginative space" for themselves. (Andrew Delbanco, review of *Where Shall Wisdom be Found? Bloom in Love*, New York Times, 10/10/2004)

Within the context of the current conflicts of psychoanalysis, the question of mastery is absent. What takes its place are normative and mechanical criteria, devoid of intellectual content, and having to do with who one's analyst is, how frequently the analyst is seen each week, what organisations are involved, and so on. The urge to define psychoanalysis using these crude criteria runs deep. In the United States, for example, having weathered the conflict over medical qualification, the former antagonists, the IPA organisations and the American Psychological Association, have formed The Psychoanalytic Consortium - US branch - to agree new criteria, more or less palatable to both, but which seek to repeat the exclusivist formalism of the earlier period.

One contribution that struck me as new and surprising, Michael Pokorny's *Who Decides Who Decides*, somewhat unusually touches directly on the contentious formation of the British Confederation of Psychotherapists (BCP). I have always thought of the BPAS's position as analogous to that of chosen people attempting to protect the stettl from the depredations of the impure. Pokorny's understanding of what took place is very different. He sees the BPAS as the naïve victim of the determination of the Tavistock Clinic to defend at all costs its unique position within the NHS. The "plot" to create the BCP was thus not so much a way of defending "purity" and "respectability" as a way of securing the interests of the Tavistock Clinic. The outcome, according to Pokorny, has been damaging to the real interests of the BPAS and has benefited only the Tavistock and Portman Clinic NHS Trust.

Part of Pokorny's thesis is that the BPAS had failed to appreciate that "psychoanalytic psychotherapy" and "psychoanalysis" were becoming difficult to distinguish in practice, especially since so many of

the former had been analysed and supervised by the latter. Thus, the distinction between psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy became increasingly formal, having to do with the name of the training organisation. The BAP has now, quite logically, delivered the second blow to the BPAS by applying for membership of the IPA: no doubt other defenders of the BPAS and the IPA are watching carefully, poised to make their own applications.

So Pokorny tells the story of the BPAS differently. It is not a politically calculating and economically grasping organisation at all: rather, it is befuddled. This is a tragedy, with the BPAS as Lear with, unfortunately, only two daughters, Goneril and Regan.

One of the problems with *Who Owns Psychoanalysis* is its absent centre. For though members of the BPAS are among the contributors, neither the BPAS nor the IPA have made contributions. This is no fault of the editor:

'As the content of some of the chapters is critical of the...IPA and the...BP-AS, I made several efforts to invite prominent officials of these organisations to be their spokespersons. It eventually became clear that...there was "no-one, unfortunately, willing to do it." ' (pp. xvii and xviii)

The editor was informed that a great deal of thinking about the question was in progress, but ' "the timing of the invitation may not be right" ' (p. xviii).

It is curious that the BPAS should assume such a mantle of thoughtful modesty. Its website, and that of the BCP, has, since the creation of the College of Psychoanalysts, been aggressively and publicly asserting absolute ownership of psychoanalysis. The assertion is a familiar one; no one may call themselves a psychoanalyst who is not a member of the BPAS and who is not affiliated to the IPA. '*Psychoanalyst* is a term which refers to someone who has undergone a full training analysis by a recognised Training Analyst of the International Psychoanalytical Association, and who has undergone an intensive training by an internationally recognised Psychoanalytical Institute.' : Simple, formal and thoughtless, ignoring as it does controversies and conflicts around the world, some resolved in courts, and, of course, ignoring the existence of international bodies other than the IPA. The conclusions drawn on the website are worth quoting. This is from the "Disclaimer-Re: College of 'Psychoanalysts' " that was published in Spring 2004: Referring to the College's criteria for membership, it says that they make "no mention...of the fact that they fall short of the standards required even for intensive psychoanalytic psychotherapy, let alone psychoanalysis". Since the website repeats the shibboleth that an analysis is five fifty minute sessions per week, it is clear that one, two, three and four times per week is something else. It then becomes necessary to claim that not only are members of the BPAS the only psychoanalysts, but that they are the only competent psychoanalytic psychotherapists. Business must, indeed, be bad.

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